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Safety recommendation: AIC 17-R05/16-2001

Addressed to: SIL Aviation

Date issued: 13 April 2017

Investigation link: AIC 16-2001

Action status: Issued

Safety deficiency description

On 16 December 2016, at 00:57 (UTC) a Fokker FK28-Mk 0100 (F100) aircraft, registered P2-AND (AND), operated by Air Niugini (ANG) Ltd, and a Quest Kodiak 100 aircraft, registered P2-SIR (SIR), operated by Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL) Aviation, were involved in a TCAS Resolution Advisory (RA) breakdown of separation serious incident about 3.5 nm (6.4 km) northwest of Nadzab Airport, Morobe Province.

SIR had tracked from the Yalumet area towards Nadzab via the Saidor Gap, located 20 nm (36.8 km) north of Nadzab Airport, to remain in visual meteorological conditions (VMC). The pilot obtained an airways clearance from Moresby Flight Service for the new destination, Nadzab, and was cleared to track 166° to Nadzab.

The pilot transferred to Nadzab Approach as instructed at time 00:52:49 UTC, and the Approach Controller subsequently cleared SIR to “*track 157° to the field*”, and cleared the aircraft to descent to 3,000 ft visual. After establishing contact with the Aerodrome Controller (ADC) at 10 nm (18.5 km) from Nadzab, SIR was cleared to join the circuit mid-downwind for runway 27, and was advised that a departing Fokker 100 was tracking on the 300° radial.

At 00:49:11, AND was issued Standard Departure Clearance (SDC) 36 by the Aerodrome Controller. At 00:51:34, AND reported ready for takeoff from runway 27 and the Aerodrome Controller provided the following clearance. “*Alpha November Delta make a left or right turn, QNH now 1008, cleared for take-off.*” The crew of AND chose a right turn after take-off and tracked to intercept the 003° radial in accordance with the SDC 36.

Shortly after AND’s first contact with Approach Control, the controller asked the crew to confirm their tracking, and used the incorrect 5-letter waypoint name. The name used was similar to the 5-letter waypoint as that on the 300° radial. The name written on the flight strip also differed from the actual 5-letter waypoint on the 003° radial.

At 00:56:06, the pilot of SIR transmitted “*Nadzab Tower, due TCAS alert, Sierra India Romeo, this is only caution on climb again to 7000. Ah got 2 miles traffic*”. At 00:57:17 the crew of AND transmitted on the Approach Control frequency “*Alpha November Delta we on a TCAS climb*”.

AND first received a Traffic Advisory (TA), which appeared on the navigation display as a yellow triangle, and aural advisory stating “*Traffic, Traffic*”. The crew reported that this was followed by a RA, displayed as a red square, and aural instruction, which stated “*Maintain vertical speed*”. The crew complied with the TCAS RA instruction.

PNG Air Services Limited and Air Niugini Limited did not report the incident, and SIL Aviation provided an initial notification 4 days after the incident. The initial notification actions were not in accordance with PNG legislated requirements.


The lack of timely notification deprived the investigation of significant data from AND’s Flight Recorders, that would have assisted in the analysis of factors that contributed to this serious incident.

Recommendation number AIC 17-R05/16-2001 to SIL Aviation

The PNG Accident Investigation Commission recommends that SIL Aviation should ensure that it meets the notification requirements in accordance with the *Civil Aviation Act 2000 (as amended) Section 60*, and the *Civil Aviation Rules Part 12*.

Action requested

The AIC requests that SIL Aviation note recommendation AIC 17-R05/16-2001, and provide a response to the AIC within 90 days of the issue date, and explain (including with evidence) how SIL Aviation has addressed the safety deficiency identified in the AIC investigation report AIC 16-2001.



DAVID INAU, ML

Chief Executive Officer

SIL Aviation response

On 13 June 2017, SIL Aviation informed the Accident Investigation Commission of its safety action to address the AIC’s safety concerns, as follows:

SAFETY AND QUALITY MANUAL, Section 13, ACCIDENT & INCIDENT REPORTING, amended as follows:

13.2 ACCIDENT/INCIDENT FLOWCHART includes the Accident Investigation Commission in initial notifications and the follow-up CAR Part 12.55 CA005 report within 3 working days.


13.3 includes notifying the Accident Investigation Commission of all initial notifications.

13.7.2 includes the requirement to submit an occurrence report on form CASA PNG 005 within 3 working days of an accident and incident.

SECURITY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANUAL, Section 4.1 paragraph 4.1.2 ACCIDENT & INCIDENT PILOT RESPONSIBILITY, amended to restrict release of information pertaining to the accident/incident except to the CASA PNG and AIC or SIL Aviation.

PNG Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) assessment of the SIL Aviation response

The AIC notes that since this deficiency was brought to the attention of SIL Aviation during the course of the investigation, subsequent notifications to the AIC have met the CAR requirements. The AIC has assessed the SIL Aviation response as satisfactorily addressing the identified safety deficiency. With respect to AIC 17-R05/16-2001 addressed to SIL Aviation, the **Status of the AIC Recommendation: Closed response accepted.**

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Hubert Namani', with a large, stylized flourish extending from the end of the signature.

Hubert Namani

Chief Commissioner

2 August 2017